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NO. 82-52,

Ariaona Governing Committee v. Norris

Revised version of footnote 6 (page 5):
When this Court held for the first time that the federal
govern.ent had the power to regulate the business of insurance, see
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322

u.s.

533

(holding the antitrust laws applicable to the business of

(1944)

insurance), Congress responded by passing the MeCarran-Perguson Act,
59 Stat. 34, 15

u.s.c.

bad a narrow focus.

SlOll et seq.

As initially proposed, the Act

It would have provided only: •That nothing

contained in the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sber.an Act, or the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as
the Clayton Act, shall be construed to apply to the business of
insurance or to acts in the conduct of that business or in any wise
i~ir

tbe regulation of that business by the several States.•

Rep.

ao.

~is

narrow version, however, was not accepted.

s.

1112, 78tb Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944) (quoting proposed act).

COngress subsequently proposed and adopted a much broader

bill.

It recognized, as it had previously, the need to accomodate

federal aatitraet laws and state regulation of insurance.
-... -.. 143, 79tb

eong., 1st Seas., 3 (1945). But it

See B.

also

c..,..t_. tllat tile decisloa ln foutb=lastern Underwrltere
, •. . . , . _ W

c-... ._...tloea •

t-. . . . . . . atlti"llldll

to tile ,....ral vall4ltr of state

2.

desires to protect the continued regulation .. . of the
business of i.nsurance by the several States."

Ibid.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act, as adopted , accordingly commits
the regulation of the insurance industry presumptively to the
States .

The introduction to the Act provides that "silence on the

part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of [the) business (of insurance] by the
several States."

15

u.s.c .

SlOll .

Section 2(b) of the Act further

provides : " No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate ,
impair , or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance • •• u n less such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance ."

Sl012(b) .

29

u.s .c.
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Revised version of footnote 7 (page 6):
Most state laws regulating insurance and annuities
explicitly proscribe "unfair discrimination between persons in the
same c.lass."

Bailey, Hutchinson & Narber, The Regulatory Challenge

to Life Insurance Classification, 25 Drake L. Rev. 779, 783 (1976).
Arizona insurance law similarly provides that there shall be "no
unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class."
Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-448 (1983).

Ariz.

Most of these States, including

Arizona, have determined that the use of actuarially sound sex-based
mortality tables comports with this state definition of
discrimination.

Given the provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act

that Congress intends to supersede state insurance regulation only
when it enacts laws that "specifically relate to the business of
insurance," see n. 6, supra, the Court offers no satisfactory reason
for concluding that Congress intended Title VII to pre-empt this
important area of state regulation.
The Court states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not
relevant because the petitioners did not raise the issue in their
brief.

See ante, at ___, n. 17.

This misses the point.

The

question presented :is whether Congress intended Title VII to prevent
employers from offering their employees--pursuant to state law-actuarially sound, sex-based annuitites.

The McCarran-Ferguson Act

is explicitly relevant to determining congressional intent.

It

provides that courts should not presume that Congress intended to
supersede state regulation of insurance unless the act in question

2.

Mspecifically rclntcs
to t he h us1ness
·
·
o f in s u rn nce ."

See n. 6,
It therefore is necessary to conside r t he appli cabi lity of

supra .

the McCarran-Ferguson Ac t i n dete r·mi n ing Congress ' i nte nt in Ti tle
VII .

This presents t wo questions : whethe r t he act i on a t i ssue unde r

Title VII involves the "business of i ns u ra nce " and whethe r the
application of Ti tle VI I wo uld " i nva l i da t e , i mpa ir, o r super sede"
state law .
No one doubts t hat the dete r mina tion of how ri s k s hould be
sp r ead among c lasses of ins ur e ds is an in tegral pa rt o f the
"busi ne ss of i ns ura nce."

See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal

Drug Co., 440 O.S. 205, 213 (1979); SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359

u. s. 65, 73 (1959).

The Court argues, nevertheless, that the

.McCarran-Ferguson Act is inapposite be cause Title VI I wi 11 not
supersede any state regulation.

Be cause Title VII applies to

employers rather than insurance carriers, the Court reasons that its
v iew of Title VII will not affect the business of insurance.
ante, at

__, n.

evident facts.

17.

See

This formalistic distinction ignores self-

State insurance laws, such as Arizona's, allow

employers to purchase sex-based annuities for their employees.
Title VII, as the Court interprets it, would prohibit employers from
purchasing such annuities for their employees.

It begs reality to

say that a federal law that thus denies the right to do what state
insurance law allows does not "invalidate, impair, or supersede"
state law.

Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 359

u.s.,

at 67.

The

Court's interpretation of Title VII--to the extent it banned the
sale of actuarially sound sex-based annuities--effectively would
pre-empt state regulatory authority.

In my view, the commands of

3.
tne McCarran-Ferguson Act are directly relevant to determining

congress' intent in enacting Title VII.

